A decade on from the euphoric high of the 2004 enlargement, where perceptions of the EU's normative power of attraction were uniform and universal, today, against the harsh realism of Russia's Crimean annexation, it has become pervasive to conclude that the EU's power and authority are in decline -both internally and externally. Faced with these challenging perceptions -partly based on evidence and partly on misinformed opinion -the EU's public diplomacy has too often been found wanting. The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis has distorted expectations and perceptions of the EU's capacity to be an effective multilateral actor, one that is less able and less willing to engage globally due to pressing, if myopic, parochial priorities.
Perceptions, of course, are by definition transient, mutable. Quite how long it takes for international views to change is the dilemma for the EU. Will the Eurozone shadow dissipate in the relatively short term (micro histoire) or cast its influence beyond 2020? Are current perceptions of the EU temporal and temporary, or symbolic of an unavoidable decline in the new BRICS world order? The evidence showcased by the leading international experts in EU external perceptions presented here is at best agnostic in this respect. Importantly, the insights offered here carry significance beyond 'perception' scholarship and are relevant to a range of contemporary EU foreign policy scholars: changing international perceptions can have a pervasive and contagious effect across the full spectrum of EU external activities and policies.
This volume followed a tripartite structure, using geography as an organizing principle, distinguishing between perceptions from the neighbourhood, from further afield and through the global lens. Not surprisingly there were individual differences, but the commonality of perceptions across different locations was the dominant feature. External perceptions of the EU under the Lisbon Treaty have not reflected the EU's aspirations. The reasons go beyond institutional arrangements (although in part these have served to further complicate who speaks for Europe rather than clarify this enduring question) and reflect changing global roles as much as the EU's own internal dynamics. The optimists of Rue de la Loi in Brussels may continue to see the glass half-full; in a world thirsty for leadership and where influence is permeable, this may no longer be reassuring.
So, what broad conclusions can we draw from the empirical evidence presented in these chapters? First, the Eurozone crisis has put the EU into the world's headlines, but whether there is no such thing as bad publicity is a moot point. Media coverage, public opinion and the impressions held by influential stakeholders have all been
